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Sharon Wahl 
Confessions of a Philosopher 
Bryan Magee is one of the world's great explainers of ph?osophy. Magee's 
gift is not just an abiUty to present abstract ideas clearly, but to give his readers 
the experience of them, an experience which, at its best, is a sort of inteUec 
tual/aesthetic, explanatory/puzzling high. He achieves this level of intensity 
by being broadly knowledgeable and insightful, but also opinionated and em 
phatic and outspoken. He is, in short, the ideal ph?osophical companion. 
Magee is not a professional ph?osopher, and this book is not a general 
overview of the subject; nor is it a conventional memoir. As he says in pref 
ace, it "introduces the reader to ph?osophy and its history through the story 
of one person's encounter with them. So it is about ideas: the autobiographi 
cal element is medium, not message." Magee's academic training (at Oxford 
and Yale) was in ph?osophy, but he made no attempt to take a PhD in the 
subject. Instead, he pursued careers in poUtics and in television broadcasting. 
Over the years Magee produced two series of programs on ph?osophy for the 
BBC. He also taught ph?osophy at Oxford, and had close friendships with 
several of the most prominent phUosophers in Great Britain, among them 
Karl Popper and Bertrand RusseU (both of whom have chapters in the book). 
The point of studying great ph?osophy, Magee claims, is to gain insights 
into the world that alter your perceptions and understanding of it; to encoun 
ter ideas through which, as Schopenhauer said of his own experience reading 
Kant, "the mind undergoes a fundamental undeceiving, and thereafter looks 
at all things in another Ught." Certain types of ph?osophical problems have 
drawn Magee's attention since ch?dhood, and he argues here for the preemi 
nence of what he takes to be these "real ph?osophical problems": 
The ur-question of ph?osophy through most of its history has been 
What, ultimately, is there? This was the dominant question for the 
pre-Socratics, and it has underlain, when it has not dominated, 
Confessions of a Philosopher, Bryan Magee. The Modern Library, 1999, 480 pages, $13.95. 
(First published in Great Britain in 1997.) 
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most of the best philosophy since. In pursuit of an answer, philoso 
phers have asked a multitude of subsidiary questions, such as What 
is the nature of physical objects? What is space? What is causal connection? 
What is time? And by a natural progression from this they have 
become deeply exercised about the possibiUty of human knowl 
edge: How can we find out these things? Can we know any of them for 
certain? If so, which? And how can we be sure we know when we do know? 
One of the central ph?osophical threads of the book, then, is an account of 
theories of perception and knowledge: problems such as how (or whether) we 
can know that our perceptions correspond to reahty. What, Descartes asked, 
can we know with complete certainty? Descartes's insight (as Magee explains 
it) was that "far from the objective being certain and the subjective uncertain, 
the only existences of which we can be indubitably sure are the immediate 
deUverances of our own consciousness." John Locke introduced the idea that 
independent of a subject to perceive it, an object cannot have such properties 
as color, taste, and smell; in itself, an object can have only physicaUy measur 
able properties such as weight or mass. All we can know of objects in the 
world is these quaUties, which we perceive with our senses. But if all we can 
know of the world is our experience, Berkeley asked, then what reason do we 
have to be?eve that anything but our experience exists in the world? Why 
postulate the existence of a world of objects outside us? 
Hume accepted Berkeley's arguments that we cannot prove the existence 
of an external world. However, "unless we are making a strained and self 
conscious attempt to be ph?osophers we cannot prevent ourselves from be 
Ueving in the existence of an external material world, even though it cannot 
be proved ... it is impossible for anyone actually to live as a skeptic." (Or, via 
Borges: "Hume noted for all time that Berkeley's arguments did not admit the 
sUghtest refutation nor did they cause the sUghtest conviction.") Nonetheless, 
Hume went on to demonstrate that "almost everything we beUeve in, or take 
for granted, is not in fact known, and can never be known. . . . We know 
almost nothing. Our thoughts are connected by the most part not by logic but 
by association of ideas, and our behavior is guided not by genuine under 
standing of reaUty but by habitual expectation and custom." 
This account of the development of empiricism wiU be famiUar to many 
readers, but what is less famiUar to a general reader is the response to Hume's 
skepticism put forward by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. Magee 
devotes several chapters to Kant's theories of space and time, and to 
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Schopenhauer's refinement and extension of Kant's ideas. His presentation of 
these concepts is the clearest I have seen. But it is not made simpler than 
would give the real character of the ideas, and Uke most of the ph?osophical 
discussions in this book, these sections reward slow reading, as well as reread 
ing. (Fortunately, Magee is somewhat repetitive. This might be a flaw in 
another type of book, but it is helpful here; Kant's theories, for example, are 
summarized in several other chapters, notably in the sections on Schopenhauer 
and Popper.) 
Though the ideas of Kant on space and time have a stunning beauty, most 
non-philosophers w?l not wish to wade through Kant's prose for this experi 
ence. ("Kant happened to be a bad writer who lacked a musical ear and was 
scribbling in a hurry to get his thoughts down on paper before he died, 
desperately trying to find ways of expressing profound ideas that were radi 
cally different from anything anyone had ever expressed before, and doing it 
in a language that had never yet been used for any such purpose.") Magee 
warns that reading primary texts is essential to understanding them; no sec 
ondary report can capture the richness of a thinker in full. But reading Magee 
on Kant and Schopenhauer might be the next best thing. The strength of this 
book is that it can give a careful reader an almost visceral feel for philosophi 
cal theories. There was a moment when I stopped reading to take an idea in: 
Schopenhauer's argument that for the world in itself (that is, the noumenal 
world, the world outside of human perception) to be differentiated in any way 
presupposes notions of space and time, notions which Kant claimed can exist 
only in our minds. I looked up from the book and focused on the objects in 
front of me?a coffee cup on a marble table?and for a moment, glimpsed 
behind these forms undifferentiated matter: one thing of two. It may seem 
absurd to claim that this book (these ideas) can make the world look different, 
but I think this is true. 
Magee, also, seems to feel ideas as an intense aesthetic experience. His 
description of his Ufe apart from philosophy shows it to be largely devoted to 
such experiences: evenings of theater, music, etc. Prominently featured among 
Magee's list of pleasures is his sex Ufe. He says a number of times how fabu 
lous it is, but gives no details of it whatsoever, a teasing omission which every 
reader of this book I know has complained of. It is a curious gap, of which he 
sometimes seems to be aware: "I was puzzled by how little attention philoso 
phers had paid to [sex]. ... Its metaphysical paramountcy stared them in the 
face, yet they had nothing to say about it," Magee writes?but then he fol 
lows suit. 
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In fact Magee ranks not ph?osophy but music as the greatest of his pas 
sions, especiaUy the music of Wagner (on whom he has also written a book). 
For Magee these experiences are not compartmentaUzed; there is for him no 
line drawn between the impulses toward inteUectual and aesthetic expression: 
"Great music, great theatre, and great ph?osophy seemed to be articulating 
something to do with the same thing." As the idea is developed by 
Schopenhauer, the ph?osopher with whom Magee feels the greatest affinity 
both as writer and thinker: "Not merely ph?osophy but also the fine arts 
work at bottom towards the solution of the problem of existence. . . . The 
result of every purely objective, and so of every artistic, apprehension of 
things is an articulation of more of the true nature of Ufe and of existence, of 
more of the answer to the question 'What is Ufe?' Every genuine and success 
ful work of art answers this question in its own way." 
In keeping with this unity of aesthetic and inteUectual experience, Magee 
discusses not only the theoretical content of ph?osophers, but also their mer 
its as 
"Uterary personaUties," and his experience of reading their books. He 
describes reading The World as Will and Representation and feeling that many of 
the thoughts he'd had his entire Ufe were for the first time given a clear 
articulation. (In fact, Magee describes a mid-Ufe crisis resolved in part by 
writing a novel, in part by his discovery of Schopenhauer.) Among other 
ph?osophers he feels should be read more widely for the pleasure of their 
writing styles are Hume, Bertrand Russell, Nietzsche, and Descartes. I am 
particularly fond of his description of Wittgenstein's Tractatus: "I do not think 
I have ever been so astonished, either before or since, at the discovery of 
what sort of book a book was. . . . [Wittgenstein's sentences] have the capac 
ity to smoulder in one's mind for the rest of one's Ufe." 
Magee's own prose combines clarity with enormous energy. I was im 
pressed with the dense informational content of even short asides: a concise 
description of Chomsky's theories of language acquisition; a defense of Descartes 
to a petulant grad student; a description of a course in political philosophy at 
Yale (in a chapter I expected to find boring: who writes about the classes they 
took in graduate school?). Such consistent generosity of explanation gives the 
book an inteUectual richness that makes reading (and especially rereading) 
even random pages a pleasure. 
The one drawback to my wholehearted recommendation of this book to 
the general reader is the order in which the various schools of philosophy are 
introduced. Magee narrates the book as personal history, and his own first 
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encounter with professional philosophy was as a student at Oxford. At that 
time the philosophy department was dominated by proponents of logical posi 
tivism (and after that, linguistic ph?osophy), movements of which Magee is 
harshly critical: "Oxford ph?osophy on the one hand, and ph?osophy as car 
ried on by such figures as Plato and Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, 
Hume, and Kant on the other, are not only not the same activity but are not, 
at bottom, importantly related." This manner of doing ph?osophy confused 
and disappointed him as a young man, and I think it is also Ukely to confuse 
readers new to the subject. It is difficult to see just why Magee criticizes these 
people as having "no real ph?osophical problems" before becoming famiUar 
with what he takes these sorts of problems to be. 
For many readers, then, the beginning of the book (that is, Chapter 2; 
Chapter 1 tells of Magee's ch?dhood) is not the best place to start. But the 
book does not need to be read in order. The more personal chapters, such as 
those covering Magee's careers in poUtics or in television, or his mid-life 
crisis, do not fiU in aU the gaps of Magee's Ufe, but can be read almost as 
thoughtful digressions. The chapters tracing the problems of perception from 
the empiricists through Kant and Schopenhauer (spread out in the book) 
could be read as a set. Or the early chapters on Oxford ph?osophy could be 
skimmed as an entertaining introduction to the pitfaUs of "professional phi 
losophy," and to an aggressive style of intellectual combat. 
It should also be mentioned that Magee does not devote much attention to 
contemporary ph?osophy, or to moral ph?osophy. There is no attempt made 
to be complete. This is Magee's account of those ph?osophers who engaged 
a hard passion in him, the books without which his Ufe would not have been 
the same: "I honestly beUeve that, since [Kant's] Critique of Pure Reason is 
unUkely to be read and understood by anyone who is not a serious student of 
ph?osophy, it is worth studying ph?osophy in order to understand that one 
book." How many people would say this of any book? But if you don't have 
another Ufe to devote to reading Kant, and are curious, then read Magee. 
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